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Abstract
This article examines the impact of pharmaceutical patent protection on the introduction of 
generic drugs on the market. Basing itself on the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
AstraZeneca case and US case law it examines, in particular, the way in which pharmaceutical 
companies may have created artificial barriers to entry for the market launch of generic drugs, so as 
to maintain market dominance by way of “life cycle management strategies”. 
Moreover, it compares the different ways, in which the EU and US have chosen to address the 
problem of the abuse of regulatory procedures by fraud with its purpose of delaying generic drug 
approvals. It also seeks to answer the question of whether the existence of a legal entitlement to a 
patent under the rules of patent law excludes competition-law liability.
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Despite the number of differences in patent protection systems, 
the EU and US confront common problems in patent protection in the 
pharmaceutical sector. One of such issues is how to prevent abuses relating 
to the introduction of generic drugs2 on the market. 
Recent research indicates that the development of a new drug costs 
*   Doctor Juris, Nicolaus Copernicus University. District Judge.
1  The article was supported by National Science Centre, Poland: grant no. 2014/15/B/
HS5/03183.
2  Pioneer drugs are brand names or patented versions of drugs manufactured by branded 
pharmaceutical companies. They are usually placed on the market after long and costly 
research. Generic drugs are a medical products similar to pioneer drugs, made and placed on 
the market after the patent expires.
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pharmaceutical companies more than 2 billion dollars3. On the other 
hand, generic drugs have grown in the past 25 years from 20 per cent of 
prescriptions to 70 per cent today4. 
The high costs of drug development limit the profitability of pioneer 
drugs without adequate patent protection. Patent law grants a temporary 
monopoly to an innovation. It protects an innovator from those who try 
to produce generic drugs. Without a patent, it is simple to produce the 
substitute drug without any need to recreate the innovator’s efforts to 
discover a new drug and without repeating the expansive, long-term tests. 
Therefore, pharmaceutical companies which produce generics do not bear 
the economic risk of the innovation. 
Pioneer drug companies try to limit the access of competitive generics 
by using a variety of instruments to extend the commercial life of their 
products as long as possible without generic entry5. Some of these actions 
are legal: the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the US and the 
European Medicines Agency (EMA) have implemented some exclusivity 
provisions to extend the life cycle of a patented product free of generic 
competition6. However, certain behaviour may be considered an abuse of 
the exclusive rights, and consequently the abuse of the competition law7. 
Until 2005, the Commission and national authorities in Europe, during 
the pharmaceutical sector inquiry, focused primarily on reverse-payment 
settlements and other agreements that delay generic entry8. For that reason, 
3   J. Avorn, The $2.6 Billion Pill — Methodologic and Policy Considerations, New England Journal 
of Medicine 2015, 372:20, p. 1877, DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp1500848 [last accessed: 01.02.2016]. 
4  C. Scott Hemphill, B.N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 2011, vol. 8, issue 4, p. 614.
5  See for example: European Commission Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, http://ec.europa.
eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html. Press release IP/09/1098, 
8.07.2009 [last accessed: 01.02.2016] and M. Hall, EU Competition Law in the Pharmaceutical 
Sector: What Has Happened Since 2009?, International Committee, ABA Section of Antitrust 
Law 2011, vol. 1, p. 4.
6  To provide an overview of the nonpatent exclusivity provisions in the United States and 
EU see: C. Hathaway, J. Manthei, C. Scherer, Exclusivity Strategies in United States and European 
Union, Food and Drug Law Policy Forum 2009, vol. 3, pp. 34-39.
7  This paper focuses only on misuse of patent rights and the abuse of regulatory procedures. 
Other artificial barrier strategies like litigation, revised payments, and the evergreening of 
pharmaceutical patent protection are not considered owing to the page limit. For a discussion 
on how trademarks are used to block generic substitution in the context of the access to generic 
medicines see: A. Lamote, P. L’Ecluse, C. Longeval, Generic Entry: a Challenge to Traditional EC 
Competition Law, Life Sciences 2009, vol. 10, pp. 73-82.
8  For example the fines imposed on a pharmaceutical company by the UK competition 
authority for selling its products to hospitals at very low prices, whilst selling the same 
products via pharmacies at very high prices to patients, a strategy that could be sustained as 
doctors were found to be strongly influenced by the brands used in hospitals (NAPP case), 
See: EC Executive Summary of the Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report, 8 July 2009, Press release 
119  | EU and US Approaches to Delayed Access to Generic Drugs by Enforcement  ... 
  
it is necessary to focus on the case of AstraZeneca9 – the first European case 
in which a pharmaceutical company was fined for an abuse of its dominant 
position in relation to “life cycle management strategies“ and to compare, 
in relevant aspects, the approach outlined by the CJEU to the US antitrust 
law. 
On the basis of the EU law, the high level of controversy raises 
the possibility of applying the competition rules to IP rights10. 
The tension between competition policy and IP rights can be reconciled 
by recognizing how market competition is consistent with innovation 
and by acknowledging the competition standards that shape the scope 
of intellectual property rights11. Competition policy, especially antitrust 
law, condemns exclusionary conduct and patent law grants exclusionary 
rights. These exclusionary rights are seen as the price of rewarding – and 
thus encouraging–innovation12. The existence and exercise of an industrial 
property right are not of themselves incompatible with competition law. 
Only in exceptional circumstances may the “exercise” of a right constitute 
an infringement of the EU competition rules and, in particular, if the 
company is dominant and its behaviour is likely to lead to the elimination 
of competition in a relevant market13. Therefore, one should examine the 
application of competition law in Europe to the specific concept of patent 
misuse doctrine and compare the specifics of such misuse to the more 
evolved US law. 
Having this in mind, this article is organized as follows. Part I begins 
with a description of the pharmaceutical regulatory framework in the EU. 
Part II analyses the legal background in this area in United States law. Part III 
describes the controversies surrounding the application of the competition 
law regime to intellectual property rights in the pharmaceutical sector; Part 
IV presents the AstraZeneca case; part V is based on the AstraZeneca case 
and the US misuse of patent doctrine; it presents the problem of delayed 
IP/09/1098, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/index.html 
[last accessed: 01.02.2016].
9  Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v. Commission, General Court judgment of 1.07.2010, 
EU:T:2010:266, and case C-457/10P AstraZeneca v. European Commission, judgment of the 
European Court of Justice (First Chamber) of 6.12.2012, EU:C:2003:546.
10  See, for instance: Commission Communication of 16.07.2008 on an Industrial Property 
Rights Strategy for Europe, COM(2008) 465 final .
11  S. Ghosh, Intellectual Property Rights: The View from Competition Policy, Northwestern 
University Law Review Colloquy 2009, vol. 103, pp. 344-345.
12  Ch.R. Leslie, Antitrust and Patent Law as Component Parts of Innovation Policy, The Journal of 
Corporation Law 2009, vol. 34, p. 1259. 
13  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and 
the European Economic and Social Committee – An Industrial Property Rights Strategy for 
Europe, COM/2008/0465 final.
access to generic drugs, and considers whether the abuse of regulatory 
procedures or, in a broader perspective, the existence of a legal entitlement 
to the patent under the rules of patent law, can be considered a competition 
law infringement and, consequently, whether it may be the basis of an 
action under art. 102 TFEU. 
II. THE PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN THE EU 
The approval system of drugs was established in the European Union 
fifty years ago in 1965 with the adoption of Directive 65/6514 and the Second 
Council Directive 75/319/EEC of 20 May 1975 on the approximation of 
provisions laid down by law, regulation, and administrative action relating 
to medicinal products15, and by Council Directive 75/318/EEC of 20 May 
1975 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
analytical, pharmaco-toxicological and clinical standards and protocols in 
respect of the testing of medicinal products16. Council Directive 93/39/EEC 
of 14 June 1993 amended Directives 65/65/EEC, 75/318/EEC and 75/319/
EEC in respect of medicinal products17. Then Council Regulation 2309/9318 
laid down procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal 
products for human and veterinary use and established a European Agency 
for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products.
Today, generic and pioneer drugs for human use authorised by the 
Member States have to meet the requirements of Regulation (EC) No 
726/200419 amending Regulation (EC) 2309/93 and Directive 2001/83/EC20. 
Directive 2001/83/EC lays down harmonised rules for the authorisation, 
supervision, and pharmacovigilance of medicinal products for human 
14  Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26.01.1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down 
by Law, Regulation, or Administrative Action relating to proprietary medicinal products, OJ 
22, 09.02.1965, pp. 0369–0373.
15  OJ L 147 of 9.6.1975, p. 13.
16  OJ L 147 of 9.6.1975, p. 1.
17  OJ L 214 of 24.8.1993, p. 22.
18  Council Regulation (EEC) No 2309/93 of 22.07.1993 laying down Community procedures 
for the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use 
and establishing a European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products (OJ L 214 of 
24.8.1993, p. 1).
19  Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31.03.2004 
laying down Community procedures for the authorisation and supervision of medicinal 
products for human and veterinary use and established a European Medicines Agency (OJ L 
136 of 30.04.2004, p. 1).
20  Directive 2001/83/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6.11.2001 on the 
Community code relating to medicinal products for human use, OJ L 311 of 28.11.2001, p. 67 
(Consolidated version: 16.11.2012).
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usewithin the Union. According to this act, an authorisation holder of 
a generic drug is not allowed to place a product on the market before the 
patent on the reference product has expired. 
The period that elapses between the filing of an application for a patent 
for a new medicinal product and authorisation to place the medicinal 
product on the market makes the period of effective protection under the 
patent insufficient to cover the investment put into the research. In order 
to provide sufficient protection for the investment in development of 
medicinal products, Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/9221 introduced 
a uniform solution at the EU level: a supplementary protection certificate 
(“SPC”) for medicinal products subject to a marketing authorisation 
procedure. Regulation No 1768/92 has been codified and repealed by 
Regulation (EC) No 469/200922. SPC is ancillary to a previously granted 
national or European patent, with the intention of a view to extending the 
duration of the rights that the patent confers on its holder. It confers the 
same rights as the basic patent and is subject to the same limitations and 
the same obligations. The regulation sets at 15 years the duration of the 
exclusive rights enjoyed by the holder of both a patent and a certificate 
from the time the medicinal product in question first obtains authorisation 
to be placed on the market in the EU23. 
 Article 3 of the regulation No 469/2009 sets out the conditions for 
obtaining a certificate. The medical product or its active ingredients must 
be protected by a basic patent in force in the Member State in which the 
application is submitted, a valid authorisation to place the product on the 
market as a medicinal product should have been granted, the product must 
not have already been the subject of a certificate, and the above-mentioned 
authorisation has to be the first authorisation to place the product on 
the market as a medicinal product. Under Article 13 of Regulation 
No 469/2009, the certificate takes effect upon the expiry of the basic patent 
for a period equal to the period which elapsed between the date on which 
the application for a patent was lodged and the date of the first authorisation 
to place the product on the market in the Community reduced by a period 
of five years. Nevertheless, the duration of the certificate may not exceed 
five years from the date on which it takes effect.
21  Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/92 of 18.06.1992 concerning the creation of 
a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products (OJ 1992 L 182, p. 1). 
22  Regulation (EC) No 469/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6.05.2009 
concerning the supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products (OJ 2009 L 152, 
p. 1).
23  Eighth recital of Regulation No 469/2009.
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III. THE PHARMACEUTICAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN THE US 
The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FFDCA)24 passed by the 
Congress in 1938, provides for additional periods of exclusivity for pioneer 
drugs based on medical studies completed after the initial approval process, 
if such studies support new indications of the drugs, which typically means 
that the drugs can be used in new patient populations or to treat different 
conditions. Drug manufacturers can apply for this additional exclusivity 
through a supplemental new drug application (“NDA”)25. 
Pursuant to the FFDCA,, in the United States a manufacturer and 
distributor of drugs – both pioneer and generics – is regulated by the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA). Competition between brand-name and 
generic drugs is regulated by the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act, informally known as the Hatch-Waxman Act26, enacted by 
the Congress in 1984.
Generally it should be noticed that, in the US, generic drugs can be 
marketed once the pioneer drug’s twenty year patent protection and FFDCA 
exclusivity periods expire. The first provision of Title I Hatch-Waxman 
Act established a new FDA procedure for generic drugs to be approved, 
based on the authorisation of an equivalent pioneer drug. While a pioneer 
drug approval requires submission of extensive and lengthy documents 
in a NDA to the FDA, a generic version of the drug can bypass a part of 
this process by filing an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) for 
the generic version of the previously approved pioneer drug27. The Hatch- 
-Waxman Act also provides for a market exclusivity period that can delay 
the approval of ANDA’s: a six months of exclusivity to any marketing 
or patent exclusivity with the drug in paediatrics populations28, 
a five-year period of market exclusivity period for NDA’s involving new 
chemical entities29, and a three-year period of market exclusivity for NDA’s 
24  Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938).
25  Case Astrazeneca Pharmaceuticals Lp, Appellant v. Food & Drug Administration, et al., United 
States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit. Appellees. No. 12–5227. Decided: 26.04.2013 
See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-dc-circuit/1629384.html#sthash.696rhVdZ.dpuf 
[last accessed: 01.02.2016]. 
26  Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 
98 Stat. 1585 (1984).
27  More on the Act’s main provisions and goals: J. Rosenthal, Hatch-Waxman Use or Abuse - 
Collusive Settlements between Brand-Name and Generic Drug Manufacturers, Berkeley Technology 
Law Journal 2002, vol. 17, pp. 317-335, available at: http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/btlj/
vol17/iss1/19 [last accessed: 1.02.2016]. 
28  21 U.S.C. § 355a.
29  21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (3) (E) (ii) and 505(b)(2).
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containing new clinical studies (especially approving a generic 
drug application for a new dosage form or use) essential to the 
approval of the application30. Moreover the Hatch-Waxman Act, allows 
the obtaining of seven years’ exclusivity period for orphan drugs31. The 
market exclusivity period is separate from patent protections. 
The FDA procedure for generic drugs states that a generic drug maker 
has a special incentive to challenge a patent, particularly if the patent is 
believed to be invalid or not infringed. The first generic company to file 
an Abbreviated New Drug Application is entitled, upon FDA approval, to 
a 180-day exclusive right to market its product in competition with the 
brand-name firm before other generic firms may enter32. The 180-day 
exclusivity period for the first applicant begins running upon the occurrence 
of one of two events, whichever is earlier – commercial marketing by the 
first applicant, or a court decision in favour of the applicant33. 
IV. ANTI-COMPETITIVE ABUSES OF THE IP SYSTEM IN THE  
 PHARMACEUTICAL SECTOR 
The debate over anti-competitive practices in the pharmaceutical 
sector should focus on finding a trade-off between the interests of drugs 
manufacturers, both pioneer and generic. Maintaining the balance between 
the branded pharmaceutical companies and their generic competitors 
requires taking into account two important factors: rewarding innovative 
pioneer drugs research and granting and ensuring wide access to 
inexpensive and safe generic versions of drugs. 
The controversies surrounding the application of the competition 
law regime to intellectual property rights are well known34. While 
some commentators stressed the legitimacy of antitrust intervention in 
30  21 U.S.C. § 355(c) (3) (E) (iii), § 355 (j)(5)(F)(iii)-(iv) and 505(b)(2).
31  21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa to 360 dd. Orphan drug means a drug intended for use in a rare disease 
or condition.
32  Hemphill, Scott, Sampat, Bhaven, supra note 4, p. 622.
33  Purepac Pharmaceutical Company, Appellant, v. Michael A. Friedman, M.D., Acting Commissioner 
of Food and Drugs, Food and Drug Administration, Appellee. Nos. 98-5334, 98-5335 and 98-5337. 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit - 162 F.3d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
More at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-dc-circuit/1179516.html#sthash.t7w6vEvS.dpuf 
[last accessed: 1.02.2016]. 
34  For a comparative analysis of these two legal regimes and its correlations see: D. Miąsik, 
Stosunek prawa ochrony konkurencji do prawa własności intelektualnej [The Interface Between 
Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy], Warszawa 2012, passim; M. Kolasiński, 
Obowiązek współpracy gospodarczej w prawie antymonopolowym [The Obligation of Economic 
Cooperation in Antitrust Law], Toruń 2009, p. 237.
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intellectual property rights35, others have expressed concern about the 
dangers of overzealous antitrust enforcement36. Sanctioning a dominant 
firm for its abuse of intellectual property rights may violate basic property 
rights. Moreover, in the EU context it may interfere with the free movement 
of goods protected by the Treaty. On the other hand, abuse of intellectual 
property rights, especially in the pharmaceutical sector, constitutes a barrier 
to, and discrimination in, free trade and distorts competition between 
companies. 
It is necessary to note that having an intellectual property rights 
and consequently a dominant position does not mean that companies 
introducing innovative products on the market should refrain from 
acquiring a comprehensive portfolio of intellectual property rights or from 
enforcing those rights. Both European and US courts pointed out in that 
regard that a dominant position is not prohibited, only its abuse37. 
While regarding the relevance attached to intellectual property rights 
and rights conferred by pharmaceutical regulations for the existence of 
a dominant position, in settled case-law the CJEU pointed out, that, although 
the mere possession of intellectual property rights cannot be considered to 
confer such a position, their possession is none the less capable, in certain 
circumstances, of creating a dominant position, in particular by enabling 
an undertaking to prevent effective competition on the market38.
V. DELAYED ACCESS TO GENERIC DRUGS BY ENFORCEMENT OF  
 A PATENT OR SPC PROCURED BY MISLEADING REPRESENTATIONS IN  
 ASTRAZENECA CASE
The European Commission’s interest in the issue of enforcement of 
a patent procured by misleading representations dates back to at least 2005. 
In that year, the Commission adopted a decision relating to a proceeding 
under Article 102 TFEU39 (ex 82 EC Treaty) and Article 54 of the EEA 
35  See: B. Berg, Das AstraZeneca-Urteil des Gerichts der Europäischen Union, Europäische 
Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht  2011, p. 94.
36  Comparative analysis in: Miąsik, supra note 34, pp. 274-275.
37  Court of Justice of the European Union in Joined Cases C-395/96 P and C-396/96 P 
Compagnie maritime belge transports and Others v. Commission [2000] ECR I-1365, par. 37; or 
United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit in case: Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 
F.2d 700, 708 (Fed.Cir. 1992).
38  Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P RTE and ITP v. Commission [1995] ECR I-743, 
Magill, p. 46,47, and Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v. Commission, p. 270.
39  Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ C 326, 
26.10.2012, pp. 47-390.
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Agreement40, by which it found that AstraZeneca AB and AstraZeneca plc  – 
– a pharmaceutical group active, worldwide, in the sector of inventing, 
developing, and marketing innovative products – had committed two 
abuses of a dominant position, in breach of article 102 TFEU and Article 54 
of the EEA Agreement41. 
What is immediately apparent on the face of the AstraZeneca decision 
is that this was the first time that the Court had an opportunity to clarify 
if a mere intention fraudulently to obtain a patent or SPC, an application 
for a patent or SPC made fraudulently, or the grant of a patent or SPC, 
which is incapable of immediate enforcement, can amount to an abuse of 
a dominant position. 
It is worth briefly sketching the genesis of the AstraZeneca case. In 1993 
and 1994, AZ submitted applications to a number of national patent offices 
within the EEA in order to obtain supplementary protection certificates 
for active substance patents for omeprazole, an active ingredient in Losec. 
It did so on the basis of Council Regulation No 1768/92 of 18 June 199242. 
The Commission determined that AstraZeneca has made misleading 
representations to patent agents, national patent offices and national 
courts, so as to obtain SPC’s for longer periods than it would have obtained 
or preserve SPC’s for omeprazole, to which AZ was not entitled. The 
Commission considered that the AZ actions were a part of an intentional 
strategy on the part of SPC, designed to keep manufacturers of generic 
products away from the relevant market and it imposed on the applicants 
jointly and severally a fine of 60 million euro. 
By an application lodged at the registry of the General Court on 
25 August 2005, the appellants brought an action for annulment of the 
decision in issue. The AZ observed that the enforcement of a patent can 
amount to an abuse of a dominant position only when the undertaking 
has wilfully acquired or enforced the patent knowing that it is invalid. 
In support of their argument, AZ referred to United States law. In their 
submission, under the US law, an antitrust action is justified where the 
patent was procured by knowingly and wilfully misrepresenting facts to 
the patent office. In that regard, neither gross negligence nor recklessness, 
nor the existence of inequitable conduct are sufficient to prove fraud. 
Moreover, in United States law, actual enforcement of the patent is 
necessary for application of the antitrust rules, mere acquisition of a patent 
40  The Agreement on the European Economic Area, which entered into force on 1.01.1994, 
OJ L1, 03.01.1994, p. 1.
41  Case COMP/A.37.507/F3 – AstraZeneca.
42  Commission Decision, para 143.
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being insufficient, since the immediate cause of the anticompetitive effect 
must be the conduct of the patent owner and not the action of the public 
agency43.
By the judgment under appeal, the General Court upheld the contested 
decision in large part and stated that AZ adopted a consistent course of 
conduct over time, characterised by the communication to the patent offices 
of misleading representations for the purposes of obtaining the issue of 
SPCs, to which it was not entitled or to which it was entitled for a shorter 
period. In accordance with the settled case-law of the Court, the concept 
of a single and continuous infringement relates to a series of actions, 
which form part of an “overall plan“ because their identical object distorts 
competition within the common market44. The General Court held that, 
although the practice of an undertaking in a dominant position cannot be 
characterised as abusive in the absence of any anti-competitive effect on 
the market, such an effect does not necessarily have to be concrete, and 
it is sufficient to demonstrate that there is a potential anti-competitive 
effect. It emphasizes that whether the information is misleading must be 
assessed on the basis of the specific circumstances of each individual case. 
Representations designed to obtain exclusive rights unlawfully constitute 
an abuse only if it is established that, in view of the objective context in 
which they are made, those representations are actually liable to lead the 
public authorities to grant the exclusive right applied for. Moreover, the 
General Court referring to the objective nature of the concept of abuse 
stressed that it was not necessary to establish a deliberate intent to deceive, 
though such an intent would be taken into account. It also held that the 
effect which those actions may have had on normal competition is not 
a conclusive criterion in assessing the proper amount of the fine. Factors 
relating to the intentional aspect, and thus to the object of a course of 
conduct, are more significant than those relating to its effects45.
CJEU upheld the General Court’s finding that AstraZeneca 
had abused its dominant position by supplying misleading 
information to national authorities and patent offices. The 
Court of Justice emphasised that AstraZeneca had engaged in 
a deliberate attempt to mislead the patent offices through “consistent and 
 
43  Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v. Commission, pp. 63, 312, 316-317. 
44  See inter alia: Case C-49/92 P Commission v. Anic Partecipazioni [1999] ECR I-4125, p. 81, and 
Joined Cases C-204/00 P, C-205/00 P, C-211/00 P, C-213/00 P, C-217/00 P and C-219/00 P 
Aalborg Portland and Others v. Commission [2004] ECR I-123, p. 258.
45  Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v. Commission, pp. 893, 895 and 902.
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linear” conduct consisting of “highly misleading representations” and 
a “manifest lack of transparency”, which fell outside the scope of 
competition on the merits46.
VI. MISLEADING REPRESENTATIONS TO THE PATENT OFFICE – 
– A VIEW FROM EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES
Maintaining the balance between the branded pharmaceutical 
companies and their generic competitors requires taking into account 
two important factors: rewarding innovative pioneer drugs research 
and granting and ensuring wide access to inexpensive and safe generic 
versions of drugs. Effective patent protection stimulates drug research and 
development, but patents are, in essence, legal monopolies. For that reason, 
generally, exercising this right should not violate antitrust laws. Only in a 
situation where the patentee’s actions go beyond that which it is specified 
under the patent, the risk of an antitrust violation comes into existence. 
Both in the US antitrust law and EU competition law dominant 
companies have been found to abuse the regulatory system with the aim of 
excluding competition and with the ultimate result of harming consumers. 
The most relevant cases in which an abuse of intellectual property rights 
has been found, both in the U.S. and in Europe, are related to undertakings 
which had a dominant position on the markets of their respective patented 
products. Immediately apparent on the face of the AstraZeneca judgement 
is that it prompted a discussion on the application of EU law whose 
requirements and standards for the finding of a novel type of abuse are 
comparatively lax compared to the US concept of patent misuse, especially 
the so-called Walker Process Doctrine47. Thus, the inquiry on how patent 
misuse might function in the EU patent law has to start from analysing 
applications from US doctrines and jurisprudence.
Basing itself on the US Court of Appeals, the patent misuse doctrine, 
born from the equitable doctrine of unclean hands, is a method of limiting 
the abuse of patent rights which is separate from the antitrust laws48. The 
46  Case C-457/10P AstraZeneca v. European Commission, pp. 93-99, 105-112.
47  S. Gallasch, Astrazeneca v. The Walker Process — A Real EU–US divergence or just an attempt 
to compare Apples to Oranges?, European Competition Journal 2011, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 505-526; 
I. Lianos, New Challenges in the Intersection of Intellectual Property Rights with Competition Law 
– A View from Europe and the United States, CLES Working Paper Series 2013, vol. 4, pp. 81-82, 
available at: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles-4-2013 
[last accessed: 1.02.2016].
48  The Supreme Court first recognized a patent misuse defence in 1917 in Motion Picture 
Patents Co. v. Universal Film Manufacturing Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Motion Picture overruled 
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patent misuse doctrine bars infringement suits by patentees, who have 
“misused” their patent grant, either by using the patent to violate the 
antitrust laws or by extending their patent monopoly in some other way49. 
This doctrine cannot be used to start a case. It is merely an affirmative 
defence, therefore a defendant does not refute what the plaintiff claims, but 
reacts by invoking an exception or a counterclaim. Unlike abuse of rights, it 
is linked to the effects of patents on competition50. It is a judicial type of tool 
to use on the perceived anticompetitive practices of patent owners51. As was 
noticed by M. Maggiolino, it has always been construed in order to deem 
illegal those practices of patentees which improperly extend the scope of 
patents52. The key inquiry under this fact-intensive doctrine is whether, 
by imposing the condition, a patentee has “impermissibly broadened” 
the “physical or temporal scope” of the patent grant with anticompetitive 
effect. If the defendant can prove that the patentee misused its patent, the 
patent is rendered unenforceable53.
There are several examples of the “impermissible broadening” of using 
a patent, which enjoys market power in the relevant market. The typical 
examples of patent misuse are restraining competition in an unpatented 
product or employing the patent beyond its term54. Much of the US Supreme 
Court’s early patent misuse doctrine was developed in cases involving 
a challenge to some form of tying arrangement55. A tying arrangement is 
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912), indicating that a tying arrangement in which the 
patentee required exhibitors to show only its movies on its patented projector was a misuse 
of the patent. Then legislation limited the application of patent misuse to the tying of staple 
products and with regard to tying arrangements. About the historical development of the 
patent misuse doctrine see: M.A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse 
Doctrine, California Law Review 1990, vol. 78, p. 1609, available at: http://scholarship.law.
berkeley.edu/californialawreview/vol78/iss6/5 [last accessed: 01.02.2016] and D. Lim, 
Patent Misuse and Antitrust Law: Empirical, Doctrinal and Policy Perspectives, Chaltenham 2013, 
pp. 38-90.
49  The nature and scope of antitrust protection in the patent area, and the contrasts between 
the antitrust laws and the patent misuse doctrine is describe by Lemley, supra note 48, 
p. 1610. 
50  M. Temmerman, The Legal Notion of Abuse of Patent Rights, NCCR Trade Regulation
Working Paper 2011, no. 23, p. 3. 
51  J.M. Webb, L.A. Locke, Intellectual Property Misuse: Developments In The Misuse Doctrine, 
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology 1991, vol. 4, p. 258.
52  M. Maggiolino, Intellectual Property and Antitrust: A Comparative Economic Analysis of U.S. 
and EU Law, Northampton 2011, p. 38. 
53  United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit. case: B. Braun Medical, Inc. v. Abbott 
Laboratories and Np Medical, Inc., Defendants/cross-Appellants, 124 F.3d 1419 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com/us-federal-circuit/1096773.html#sthash.4JFqhlTx.
dpuf [last accessed: 1.02.2016]. 
54  Ibidem.
55  United States Court of Appeals, Federal Circuit case Mallinckrodt, 976 F.2d at 704, 24 
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“the sale or lease of one item (the tying product) on the condition that the 
buyer or lessee purchases a second item (the tied product) from the same 
source”56. In the decision in the case Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., the 
United States Supreme Court held as an  example that a tying arrangement, 
where the patent licence was conditioned upon the purchase of a separate, 
staple product amounted to patent misuse, because in such a case “the 
patent is used as a means of restraining competition with the patentee’s 
sale of an unpatented product”. The plaintiff Morton Salt brought suit 
on the basis that the defendant had infringed upon Morton’s patent in 
a salt-depositing machine. The salt tablets that the machine deposited 
were not themselves a patented item, but Morton’s patent license required 
that licensees use only salt tablets produced by Morton57. A good example 
of exploiting the patent beyond the end of the protection term is a case 
Brulotte v. Thys Co.58. In Brulotte the United States Supreme Court held 
that when a patent owner licenses a patented invention to a buyer of the 
equipment that embodies the invention and, in addition to the purchase 
price, requires the licensee to pay royalties for use of the invention, the 
licensee is not obligated to pay royalties beyond the date of termination 
of the patent, notwithstanding contract terms to the contrary59. The post- 
-patent royalty provision was “unlawful per se”, because it continued “the 
patent monopoly beyond the patent period”60.
The main aspects of the US common law patent misuse doctrine were 
USPQ2d at 1176.
56  Amerinet Inc. v. Xerox Corp., 972 F.2d 1483, 1498 (8th Cir. 1992), available at http://caselaw.
findlaw.com/us-8th-circuit/1139833.html#sthash.A6Ai6Rlc.dpuf [last accessed: 1.02.2016]. 
Generally about patent exhaustion cases see: W.P. Skladony, Commentary on Select Patent 
Exhaustion Principles in Light of the LG Electronics Cases, The Intellectual Property Law Review 
2007, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 252-253.
57  The decision of the United States Supreme Court Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 
U.S. 488, 490-91, 62 S.Ct. 402, 86 L.Ed. 363 (1942), See more at: http://caselaw.findlaw.com /
us-federal circuit/ 1073936.html#sthash.HRQL4lrC.dpuf [last accessed: 01.02.2016].
58  The United States Supreme Court, Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964).
59  About the Brulotte decision in its historical and conceptual context see: H. See, F.M. 
Caprio, The Trouble with Brulotte: The Patent Royalty. Term and Patent Monopoly Extension, Utah 
Law Review 1990, vol. 4, p. 813; Miąsik, supra note 34, pp. 274-275.
60  On June 2015, the US Supreme Court upheld a prohibition against a patent owner collecting 
royalties following the patent’s expiration in Kimble et al. v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 
576 U.S. (2015). Contrary Justice Alito, The Chief Justice and Justice Thomas in their dissenting 
to decision in Kimble notice that: “That decision in Brulotte v. Thys Co. was not based on 
anything that can plausibly be regarded as an interpretation of the terms of the Patent Act. 
It was based instead on an economic theory—and one that has been debunked. The decision 
interferes with the ability of parties to negotiate licensing agreements that reflect the true value 
of a patent, and it disrupts contractual expectations.(…) A licensing agreement that provides 
for the payment of royalties after a patent’s term expires does not enlarge the patentee’s 
monopoly or extend the term of the patent. It simply gives the licensor a contractual right”.
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reflected in § 271 (d) US Code, stating that: “No patent owner otherwise 
entitled to relief for infringement or contributory infringement of a patent 
shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the 
patent right by reason of his having done one or more of the following: 
(1) derived revenue from acts, which, if performed by another without 
his consent, would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; 
(2) licensed or authorized another to perform acts which if performed 
without his consent would constitute contributory infringement of the 
patent; (3) sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or 
contributory infringement; (4) refused to license or use any rights to the 
patent; or (5) conditioned the license of any rights to the patent or the sale 
of the patented product on the acquisition of a license to rights in another 
patent or purchase of a separate product, unless, in view of the circumstances, 
the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the patent or 
patented product on which the license or sale is conditioned”.
Well established in the US antitrust law patent misuse is fraud-on-
the-patent-office violation61. The US Supreme Court decision of Walker 
Process Equipment, established that the fraudulent procurement of 
a patent or the enforcement of a patent knowingly obtained by fraud on the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) may be the basis of an action under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act62. A claim of Walker Process fraud is a sword 
to impose antitrust liability and treble damages upon a patentee. Antitrust 
liability under section 2 of the Sherman Act may arise when three conditions 
have been met: a patent has been procured by knowing and wilful fraud, 
the patentee has market power in the relevant market, and has used its 
fraudulently obtained patent to restrain competition. Moreover, a finding 
of Walker Process fraud must be based on independent and clear evidence 
of deceptive intent together with a clear showing of reliance, i.e., that the 
patent would not have issued but for the misrepresentation or omission. 
Fraud therefore should be premised on a knowing, wilful and intentional 
act, misrepresentation or omission before the Patent and Trademark 
Office63.
61  For details see: Ch. R. Leslie, Antitrust, Inequitable Conduct, and the Intent to Deceive the 
Patent Office, UC Irvine Law Review 2011, vol. 1, pp. 325-356.
62  Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
63  See U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit – Nobelpharma Ab v. Implant Innovations, 
Inc., 141 F.3d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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VII.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Ten years after the AZ decision one may reach some broad conclusion 
relating to whether the patent infringement can be considered an 
infringement of a competition law, and, consequently, whether it may be 
the basis of an action under art. 102 TFEU. The main conclusion of this 
assessment is that the existence of a legal entitlement to the patent under 
the rules of patent law, does not exclude competition-law liability64. Article 
102 TFEU applies to applications for acquiring or extending an intellectual 
property right. In keeping with the realistic approach which had guided it, 
the CJEU took account of certain specific and objective factors: 
the intent and purpose (bad faith): the misleading representations to • 
the patent office’s made by an undertaking in a dominant position in 
order to obtain extended patent protection cannot be characterised 
as an abuse unless it is an action which is conceived in the framework 
of a plan with its goal being to eliminate competition. It does not 
breach competition when a wrong representation is made in good 
faith. Simple unintentional mistakes in a patenting process could 
not be held to be an abuse
specific circumstances of the case: for assessment of the specific • 
circumstances of the case it is necessary to establish, whether an 
undertaking abused its dominant position in making representations 
to a public authority. 
In the US, similar infringements have met with a more subtle approach 
and, owing to the different nature of the proceedings, they cannot be 
directly applicable to EU law. According to the Walker Process, the 
fraudulent procurement or extension of a patent can form the basis for an 
antitrust claim under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. A patentee 
who brings an infringement suit may be subject to antitrust liability for 
the anti-competitive effects of that suit, if the alleged infringer proved 
that the asserted patent was obtained through knowing and wilful fraud. 
In order to strip a patentee of its exemption from the antitrust laws because 
of its attempting to enforce its patent monopoly, an antitrust plaintiff is 
first required to prove that the patentee obtained the patent by knowingly 
 
 
64  J. Drexl, AstraZeneca and the EU Sector Inquiry: When Do Patent Filings Violate Competition 
Law?, Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law Research Paper 
2012, no. 12-02, pp. 28-29, available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2009276 [last accessed: 
1.02.2016].
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and wilfully misrepresenting facts to the PTO. The plaintiff in the patent 
infringement suit must also have been aware of the fraud when bringing 
suit.
The US patent laws do not expressly give any private right of action 
against patentees for damages for overcharging for a patented article 
simply because the patent was or may have been obtained by means of 
a fraud on the Patent Office65. By contrast, in the EU, if misleading 
statements are regarded as an abuse, it cannot be excluded that they may 
be the basis of public and private enforcement of EU competition law on the 
basis of art. 102 TFEU. The Commission can impose fines on undertakings 
that have infringed these provisions66. Article 102 TFEU creates rights and 
obligations for individuals67, which can be enforced by the national courts 
of the Member States68 and, consequently, it cannot be excluded that generic 
producers could claim compensation for the harm suffered, where there is 
a causal relationship between that harm (barriers to entry for the market 
launch of the generic drugs) and an infringement of the EU competition 
rules (intention fraudulently to obtain a patent or SPC, an application for 
a patent or SPC made fraudulently, or the grant of a patent or SPC, which 
is incapable of immediate enforcement).
To sum up, it must be remembered that effective patent protection 
stimulates drug research and development. For that reason, generally, 
exercising this right should not be held to violate competition laws. Only in 
a situation where the patentee’s actions go beyond that which is specified 
under the patent, does the risk of an anticompetitive violation come into 
existence. Therefore, one must agree with the position, that competition 
law liability in patent filing cases has to remain the very rare exception 
rather than a basis for frequent enforcement action69.
65  Compare: Zenith Laboratories, Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 530 F.2d 508 (3d Cir.). 
66  Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 of 16.12.2002 on the implementation of the rules 
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty (OJ L 1, 4.01.2003, p. 1) gives 
the Commission and the national competition authorities powers to apply article 102 of the 
Treaty.
67  Article 6 of Regulation No. 1/2003.
68  The EU right to compensation for harm resulting from infringements of the European Union 
and national competition law. It has been strengthened by adopting the Directive 2014/104/
EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26.11.2014 on certain rules governing 
actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions 
of the Member States and of the European Union, OJ L 349/1, 5.12.2014.
69  Drexl, supra note 64, p. 29.
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